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H.264/SVC (Scalable Video Coding) codestreams, which consist of a single base layer and multiple enhance-
ment layers, are designed for quality, spatial, and temporal scalabilities. They can be transmitted over
networks of different bandwidths and seamlessly accessed by various terminal devices. With a huge amount
of video surveillance and various devices becoming an integral part of the security infrastructure, the indus-
try is currently starting to use the SVC standard to process digital video for surveillance applications such
that clients with different network bandwidth connections and display capabilities can seamlessly access var-
ious SVC surveillance (sub)codestreams. In order to guarantee the trustworthiness and integrity of received
SVC codestreams, engineers and researchers have proposed several authentication schemes to protect video
data. However, existing algorithms cannot simultaneously satisfy both efficiency and robustness for SVC
surveillance codestreams. Hence, in this article, a highly efficient and robust authentication scheme, named
TrustSSV (Trust Scalable Surveillance Video), is proposed. Based on quality/spatial scalable characteris-
tics of SVC codestreams, TrustSSV combines cryptographic and content-based authentication techniques to
authenticate the base layer and enhancement layers, respectively. Based on temporal scalable character-
istics of surveillance codestreams, TrustSSV extracts, updates, and authenticates foreground features for
each access unit dynamically with background model support. Using SVC test sequences, our experimental
results indicate that the scheme is able to distinguish between content-preserving and content-changing
manipulations and to pinpoint tampered locations. Compared with existing schemes, the proposed scheme
incurs very small computation and communication costs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The scalable extension of H.264, referred to as Scalable Video Coding (SVC) [Schwarz
et al. 2007], consists of a single base layer that is compatible with the H.264 Advance
Video Coding (AVC) standard, and multiple enhancement layers that improve the
video in one of three scalability dimensions (quality, resolution, and time). SVC codecs
adapt to subpar network connections by dropping these enhancement layers in order
to reduce the frame rate, resolution, or bandwidth consumption of a picture, which
prevents the picture from breaking up. For instance, a mobile phone would receive only
the base layer, while a high-definition video conferencing console would receive both the
base layer and enhancement layers. With huge video surveillance and various devices
becoming an integral part of the security infrastructure, the industry is currently
starting to use the SVC standard to process digital video for surveillance applications
such that clients with different network bandwidth connections and display capabilities
can seamlessly access various SVC surveillance (sub)codestreams. Figure 1 illustrates
an indoor SVC surveillance system that can flexibly distribute (sub)codestreams to
TVs, tablets, and smartphones over different network bandwidths.
However, with sophisticated multimedia processing tools, any layer of SVC surveil-
lance codestreams can be modified without leaving any visible traces for human eyes
[Wei et al. 2010, 2012, 2014b]. Modified surveillance data have virtually no value as
legal proofs since doubts would always exist. Thus, a video authentication scheme
is required to thwart any unauthorized manipulations by verifying the integrity and
source of the data [Zhu et al. 2004; Hefeeda and Mokhtarian 2011]. An authentication
scheme for authenticating surveillance codestreams should meet three basic require-
ments: security, computational efficiency, and communication efficiency. Furthermore,
a scheme for authenticating an SVC surveillance codestream should have the following
additional properties. First, it preserves the scalability of the original SVC surveillance
codestream. That is, it authenticates the original SVC codestream once at the source,
but allows verification of various three-dimensional (sub)codestreams (spatial, quality,
and temporal scalabilities) at the recipient. Second, it is able to pinpoint the tam-
pered regions if tampering indeed occurred. Third, it is robust or resilient to content-
preserving manipulations (e.g., scale/recompression images) that do not change the
semantic meaning of a codestream but are sensitive to content-changing manipula-
tions (e.g., removing/replacing/inserting images) that modify the semantic meaning
of the codestream. Although engineers and researchers have proposed several au-
thentication solutions for SVC codestreams, existing solutions that are classified into
content-based authentication, cryptographic-based authentication, and watermarking-
based authentication cannot simultaneously satisfy the aforementioned requirements
as authenticating big SVC codestreams.
Content-based authentication [Han and Chu 2010] is independent of the compres-
sion operation. It ensures the authenticity of multimedia features. The advantage of
content-based authentication is that it can distinguish content-preserving and mali-
cious manipulations. The works most relevant to our research are the AUSSS scheme
in Wei et al. [2013] and the hybrid scheme in Wei et al. [2014a], which protect the
integrity of the base layer and enhancement layers by employing cryptographic and
content-based authentication, respectively. The hybrid scheme [Wei et al. 2014a] does
not consider video content, which authenticates all images of SVC codestreams with
the same solution, while AUSSS considers video contents. AUSSS and the scheme pre-
sented in this article try to avoid repeatedly transmitting content-based features of
static fields in order to improve communication and computation efficiencies. AUSSS
makes use of coding information (e.g., macroblock type, Coded Block Pattern (cbp)) of
the base layer to locate “Active” Blocks (ABlocks). However, ABlocks may be bypassed
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Fig. 1. An example SVC surveillance system.
as the base layer chooses a larger Quantization Parameter (QP).1 If the QP of the base
layer is set too large, coefficients of most of the macroblocks of the base layer are zero,
and AUSSS sets the macroblocks as static block. However, the macroblocks in fact con-
tain detailed texture content (i.e., macroblocks should be ABlocks); without extracting
and protecting content features of them, adversaries may attacks those macroblocks of
the enhancement layer (e.g., removing or replacing content).
Cryptographic-based authentication in general performs compression first, and then
authentication. For instance, Yu [2004] and Mokhtarian and Hefeeda [2010] proposed
hash chain schemes for SVC codestreams. These schemes hash each enhancement
layer and attach the hash value to the lower layer of the same frame. Recently, Zhao
et al. [2012] presented an improved authentication scheme for H.264/SVC, which inte-
grates cryptographic algorithms and Erasure Correction Codes (ECCs). They provide
a mathematically provable level of security and guarantee a high security confidence.
However, cryptographic-based authentication schemes are sensitive to content modi-
fications since they cannot tell the difference between content-changing and content-
preserving manipulations. Furthermore, since they must execute a hash function for
each layer, their computation complexity and communication overhead are proportional
to the number of layers.
Watermarking-based authentication embeds a reference object (e.g., image or mes-
sage) into an SVC codestream [Shi et al. 2010; Park and Shin 2008, 2011]. Grois and
Hadar [2012] provided a review of watermarking-based authentication schemes for
SVC. As the reference object and the SVC codestream are mixed together, the em-
bedded object will be tampered when the SVC codestream is maliciously tampered.
For example, Meerwald and Uhl [2010] designed a robust watermarking-based au-
thentication scheme by embedding the same watermark into both the base layer and
enhancement layers for quality/spatial scalability. For the sake of robustness and se-
curity, watermarking-based authentication schemes must embed the reference object
1Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients are quantized to approach zero by larger QPs; cbps are zero.
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into each layer of SVC; otherwise, the nonwatermarked layers can be easily tampered
without being detected. However, the capacity of embedding watermarking is very lim-
ited in enhancement layers because most quantized coefficients of enhancement layers
are equal to zero.
In this article, we present a novel and efficient authentication scheme for SVC
surveillance codestreams, named TrustSSV (Trust Scalable Surveillance Video).
TrustSSV integrates authentication and verification operations into the SVC coding
process. Specifically, TrustSSV uses cryptographic authentication primitives to calcu-
late the hash of the base layer codestream such that any bit of the base layer cannot be
changed. Considering surveillance codestreams usually containing stable background
scenes, TrustSSV exploits content-based authentication to protect background features
and dynamical foreground features with background model support, which guarantees
the integrity of enhancement layers. Our analysis indicates that the proposed scheme
is secure and robust. It can allow localization of tampered regions and preserve three-
dimensional SVC scalabilities. Compared with the existing authentication schemes
[Wei et al. 2013, 2014a; Mokhtarian and Hefeeda 2010; Meerwald and Uhl 2010], our
experimental results show that TrustSSV has very a small communication overhead
and low computation complexity. It is suitable to be applied to most video streams with
layered structures (e.g., HEVC/SVC, JPEG-XR).
The main contributions and key results of this article are summarized as follows:
—Novelly exploiting the multiple layer architecture (base layer and quality/spatial en-
hancement layers) of SVC and the temporal layers of surveillance, TrustSSV protects
the integrity of surveillance video codestreams using content-based authentication
and watermarking-based authentication.
—Since SVC surveillance videos have temporal scalabilities, the recipient’s devices may
only receive nonsuccessive frames. TrustSSV novelly performs initial background
and real-time updates of background models. Once the former constructs Ib, the
latter depends on Ib but has no previous frames as statistical reference to distinguish
background from foreground for each AU. When there is an obvious change between
background and foreground and it is constant (e.g., 5 ∼ 10 minutes), TrustSSV
will dynamically alternate the outdated background Ib with the latest one (Update
Inactive Blocks). In addition, the update of the background must be synchronous with
Network Abstract Layer Units (NALUs) of the base layer; otherwise, the update of
the background may be discarded with higher temporal enhancement layers.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents scalable video cod-
ing. Our authentication scheme is introduced in Section 3. Experiments and analysis
results are given in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Lastly, conclusions are drawn
in Section 6.
2. SCALABLE VIDEO CODING
This section provides a quick overview of the H.264/SVC concepts and terminologies
that are necessary for the understanding of the rest of the article.
2.1. H.264/SVC Standard
An SVC codestream is divided into a base layer and one or more enhancement lay-
ers, and each layer is further divided into NALUs. Due to the flexible arrangement of
NALUs, SVC provides three kinds of scalabilities for the sake of bit-rate adaptation to
network bandwidth and/or end devices’ capabilities, as depicted in Figure 2. The three
axes in Figure 2 correspond to three-dimensional scalabilities of H.264/SVC, that is,
temporal, quality, and spatial scalabilities. Bars with various widths and lengths in
Figure 2 refer to frames belonging to different layers. Specifically, the wider ones are at
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Fig. 2. An example H.264/SVC codestream with scalability in three dimensions. There are four temporal
layers, two spatial layers, and one quality layer.
the quality enhancement layer, while the longer ones are at the spatial enhancement
layer. In addition, DxQyTz next to the bars indicates frames’ spatial, quality, and tem-
poral identification. If and only if both x and y are equal to zero, frames (bars) belong to
the base layer. Otherwise, frames (bars) belong to enhancement layers. Assuming the
Group of Picture (GOP) size of an H.264/SVC codestream is nine, based on the hier-
archical prediction structure, nine frames will be grouped into four temporal layers as
shown in Figure 2, where the numbers (0 to 8) are the order of the nine frames inside
a GOP.
2.1.1. Temporal Scalability. As frames in the temporal base layers are encoded with
the highest fidelity, and a lower temporal layer is used as references for motion-
compensated prediction of frames in higher temporal layers, temporal scalable coding
can be readily achieved; that is, by simply discarding the higher-layer frames for an
SVC codestream, a lower bit-rate one is formed.
2.1.2. Spatial Scalability. The spatial base layer represents a video of the lowest resolu-
tion while the spatial enhancement layers increase the resolutions of the video. Since
interlayer prediction is used, a lower spatial layer must be presented if a higher spatial
layer exists, but not the other way around. Therefore, when the spatial layers are dis-
carded starting from the highest layer, the rest of the spatial layers are still decodable.
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This discarding process can be repeated until only one layer (the base layer) remains.
In other words, the resolution of a video can be decreased directly and gradually.
2.1.3. Quality Scalability. The quality base layer is encoded at the lowest visual quality,
and the quality enhancement layers increase the visual quality of the decoded sequence.
Therefore, when the quality layers are discarded starting from the highest layer, the
rest of the quality layers are still decodable. This discarding process can be repeated
until only one quality layer remains.
3. AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
The present scheme seamlessly integrates authentication and verification operations
into the SVC coding process. It differs fundamentally from AUSSS by utilizing a back-
ground model to detect ABlocks such that the content integrity of all ABlocks is guar-
anteed. We describe the background model in Section 3.1 and feature extraction in
Section 3.2; the authentication module for the base layer is presented in Section 3.3,
which is the same with AUSSS; and the authentication module for enhancement layers
is elaborated in Section 3.4.
3.1. Background Model
Over the past years, various background models have been developed based on statistics
of pixels of successive frames. Bouwmans [2011] summarizes and compares the recent
advanced statistical models by classifying them into three categories. For surveillance
applications, Brutzer et al. [2011] review and evaluate nine background subtraction
techniques of surveillance video, and compare the performance of nine background
subtraction methods with postprocessing according to their ability to meet seven chal-
lenges (e.g., gradual/sudden illumination changes, camouflage, and video noise). How-
ever, since SVC surveillance videos have temporal scalabilites, the recipient’s devices
may only receive nonsuccessive frames. Thus, the existing background model algo-
rithms will result in the mismatch of detected background and foreground between
providers and receivers.
In an SVC surveillance scheme, a background model should be adaptive to scene
changing (e.g., switching between background and foreground) and robust to illumina-
tion changes and image processing (e.g., compression (quality scalability) or resolution
resample (spatial scalability)). Based on the analysis and comparison in Brutzer et al.
[2011], the mixture Gaussian model [Zivkovic and Heijden 2006] stands out among the
others. In Zivkovic and Heijden [2006], each pixel is characterized by its intensity in
the RGB color space. The probability of observing the current pixel value is given by
P(Xt) =
K∑
i=1
ωi,t · η(Xt, μi,t, i,t), (1)
where K is the number of distributions, and ωi,t is a weight associated to the ith Gaus-
sian distribution at time t with mean μi,t and standard deviation i,t. η is a Gaussian
probability density function:
η(Xt, μ,) = 1(2π )n/2||1/2 e
− 12 (Xt−μ)T −1(Xt−μ), (2)
where X = {X1, . . . , Xn} are the recent histories of the color features of each pixel. In
addition to the previous parameters, both the weight ω and learning rate α parameters,
which are used for updating equations, need to be initialized by training in order to
correctly construct a stable background model.
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In order to improve the communication and computation efficiency of our authentica-
tion scheme, we first scale the original image to the same resolution as the base layer,
then perform the background model. For instance, if the original sequence is Common
Intermediate Format (CIF) and base layer resolution is Quarter Common Intermediate
Format (QCIF), we need first to scale CIF to QCIF. The present scheme includes two
background detection processing techniques. Initially, for a surveillance scene, we use
the technique in Zivkovic and Heijden [2006] to generate a stable background image Ib
and extract its content-based features, which represent the initial surveillance scene.
Then dynamically, once Ib is constructed, different from Zivkovic and Heijden [2006],
we utilize Ib but no previous frames as statistical reference to distinguish background
from foreground for each AU, which solves the mismatch problem between providers
and receivers due to temporal scalability. After locating foreground and background
regions, the positions and content-based features of the foreground are transmitted
with the AU. At the same time, we constantly detect background changes and update
Ib such that Ib always represents a real-time surveillance scene.
3.2. Feature Extraction
We will first explain background operations in Section 3.2.1, then present foreground
operations in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1. Background Operations. Background operations consist of offline and online pro-
cessing.
Initial background model. Assume that we obtain the background image Ib of the
current SVC surveillance scene. The candidate feature extraction methods include in-
variant histogram statistics [Schneider and Chang 1996; Alghoniemy and Tewfik 2004;
Simitopoulos et al. 2003; Kim and Lee 2003; Su et al. 2009] and the relation between
low-frequency DCT coefficients [Lin and Chang 2001; Fridrich and Goljan 2000]. We
utilize the NMF (Nonnegative Matrix Factorization) transform to extract content-based
features of Ib, which performs the best in terms of robustness and sensitivity [Han and
Chu 2010]. The NMF algorithm [Lee and Seung 2000] is able to decompose a nonneg-
ative matrix into two nonnegative matrix factors. Monga and Mihcak [2007] exploit
the NMF algorithm and propose a robust and secure image hashing method, named
NMF-NMF-SQ hashing. NMF-NMF-SQ is very robust to a large class of perceptually
insignificant manipulations for JPEG and is able to tolerate H.264 compression with
QP = 38 [Wei et al. 2013].
Given Ib, we pseudo-randomly choose an “Inactive” Block (IB) whose resolution is
m× m (e.g., m = 4), then perform the r1 (e.g., r1 = 1) rank NMF transform on it and
output two matrices Xi and YTi . The two matrices are reconnected to be a hash vector
V ibi of the IB. Then, all V
ib
i are organized into
V ib = {V ib1 , · · · ,V ibn }. (3)
Note that V ib is the content-based features of Ib, where n is the total number of m×m
blocks in the background image, and each component needs 12 bits. Also, note that
V ib is the most important and basic authentication tag; it represents the current
surveillance background scene. Once a receiver needs to collect surveillance data, V ib
will be transmitted to each receiver over a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) channel before
sending SVC surveillance codestreams.
Real-time update of backgroundmodel. Although there is a relatively stable back-
ground scene for surveillance applications, it is possible that the leaving/stopping of
objects causes the background change. Specifically, the foreground switches to a new
background (e.g., a motion object stops at one place for a long time), and the background
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Fig. 3. Detection of foreground and the location of ABlocks, where white square indicates a located ABlock.
can also switch to a new background (e.g., a static object moves away for a long time).
Hence, once there is an obvious change between background and foreground and the
change is constant (e.g., 5 ∼ 10 minutes), the scheme will dynamically alternate the
outdated background Ib with the latest one. In this article, the pixel-based distance
function of the mixture Gaussian model is described as
D < δ ∗ σ, (4)
where D is the substraction result, δ is the threshold of variance, and σ is the standard
deviation. δ and σ can be determined by experiments.
D = Dr2 + Dg2 + Db2, (5)
where Dr, Dg, and Db are the distances of RGB elements. If D satisfies Equation (4),
the pixel is background; otherwise, it is foreground.
A UIB (Update Inactive Block) should satisfy that it is an ABlock and keeps the same
content for a long time. First, the mixture Gaussian model is based on pixel units; that
is, given a pixel, it can indicate if the pixel belongs to the foreground. In this article,
an m× m (e.g., m= 4) ABlock is constructed based on the following guidelines:
—If an m× m block does not contain foreground pixel, it is a background block.
—If an m× m block contains no less than two foreground pixels, it is an ABlock.
—If an m×mblock contains only one foreground pixel and one of its eight neighboring
blocks also contains one or more foreground pixels, it is an ABlock; otherwise, it is a
background block.
For example, Figure 3 illustrates the detection of foreground and the location of
ABlocks.
Second, the content of the ABlock is still not changing for a long time. For each
ABlock, the proposed scheme further executes the NMF transform to extract content-
based features, the same as with IBs. If the content-based features of an ABlock are
invariant for successive frames, the ABlock in fact is a UIB.
As all UIBs with resolution m× m are detected and located, their features are orga-
nized as
Vuib = Vuib1 , . . . ,Vuibnuib︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (6)
Their positions are organized as
Puib = nuib, (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)︸ ︷︷ ︸, (7)
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where Vuibi is the features of the ith UIB, n
uib is the number of UIBs, and (xi yi) are the
positions of the ith UIB. Meanwhile, the present scheme encrypts Vuib and Puib with
ciphertext (e.g., AES) in order to protect the security of the UIB against adversaries’
attacks.
Although the present scheme ensures UIBs, TrustSSV does not immediately send
Vuib and Puib with NALUs of the base layer due to temporal scalability whose enhance-
ment layers may be discarded based on receivers’ requirements. Hence, the update of
the background must be synchronously with the base layer NALUs whose temporal
identification is zero. That is, if and only if x, y, and z of NALU scalability (DxQyTz)
are all zero, Vuib and Puib can be sent along with SVC surveillance codestreams. Oth-
erwise, the update of the background (i.e., Vuib and Puib) may be discarded with higher
temporal enhancement layers.
3.2.2. Foreground Operations. Foreground operations consist of transmission of the
ABlock position and extraction of ABlock features.
Transmission of ABlock position. We make use of watermarking techniques to
embed the position information of ABlocks, P, into the base layer. We adjust the last
nonzero DCT coefficients of base layer blocks with odd or even.
—ABlock:
—If its coefficients are all zero, set the last coefficient as 1.
—If its last nonzero coefficient is odd, add 1 to the last coefficient.
—If its last nonzero coefficient is even, do nothing.
—IB:
—If its coefficients are all zero, do nothing.
—If its last nonzero coefficient is odd, do nothing.
—If its last nonzero coefficient is even, add 1 to the last coefficient.
In all, if a block has nonzero coefficients and its last coefficient is even, the block
is an ABlock. Otherwise, the block is an IB. Generally, embedded watermarking may
not only introduce noise to images, which decreases the visual quality of images, but
also affect entropy coding and cause communication overhead. However, the proposed
watermarking has less effect on visual quality and compression. First, as watermarking
is embedded into the last coefficients of blocks (i.e., high-frequency band), it has little
effect on vision. Second, the H.264 standard exploits motion compensation techniques
to reduce temporal redundancy, and most of the IBs of enhancement temporal layers do
not contain nonzero coefficients (i.e., if its coefficients are all zero, do nothing). Hence,
only partial watermarking of ABlocks produces communication overhead.
Extraction of ABlock features. Assuming one frame has nf ABlocks {Bi}, its cor-
responding NMF transform hash is hi, which is concatenated from two transform
matrices (the columns of Xi and the row of Yi). Then, the hash h of the frame fore-
ground is {h1,h2, . . . ,hnf }, where the length of hi is v. In this article, in order to reduce
the communication overhead and protect the security of extracted features, the pro-
posed authentication scheme unitizes pseudo-random weight vectors {ti}ui=1 (u ≤ v) to
compress h, where each ti is the length of v. We set u as
u=
{
nf , nf < 16
nf /16, nf ≥ 16. (8)
The pseudo-random weight vectors {ti}ui=1 are generated using HC-128 [Wu 2008] with
the secret key ke and an initialization vector (IV ). The initialization vector should be
unique for each Access Unit (AU) such that the resulting pseudo-random vectors do
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Fig. 4. Authentication flow of SVC surveillance codestreams.
not repeat themselves. In this article, IV is generated as
IV = F(P, Hn, Hs), (9)
where F is a one-way function, P is the position information, Hn represents the SVC
scalable information (e.g., temporal identifier), and HS denotes the slice header of the
base layer that is protected by MAC. Because the header information is in clear text,
IV can be deduced from the SVC codestream at the decoder/verifier side.
Let Vi = 〈h, ti〉 be the inner product of vector h and vector ti, and then Vf =
{V1, . . . ,Vu} is the extracted features of ABlocks {Bi}.
3.3. Authentication and Verification of Base Layer
On the provider side, the scheme takes base layer codestream 	b and a secret key kb
shared by provider and receiver as input to produce MAC φ as
φ = H(kb,	b), (10)
whereH(·) is a standard one-way hash function (e.g., SHA-1). We construct one Supple-
ment Enhancement Information (SEI) NALU for each AU, and the calculated hash φ is
encapsulated into its SEI NALU. The operations shown at the top of Figure 4 illustrate
the authentication of the base layer.
Given a received base layer codestream b, the receiver first calculates the MAC
value ψ as
ψ = H(kb, b). (11)
Then, for the received φ encapsulated into the corresponding SEI NALU, if ψ = φ,
the authentication framework accepts the base layer’s codestream. Otherwise, the
codestream of the base layer is considered tampered, and both the base layer and all
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Fig. 5. Verification flow of SVC surveillance codestreams.
the enhancement layers are rejected. The top of Figure 5 illustrates the processing of
base layer verification.
Moreover, temporal scalability is synchronously verified because the timestamp and
frame number are authenticated by MAC such that the frame reordering attack in
which the temporal order of frames may be changed can be detected.
3.4. Authentication and Verification of Enhancement Layers
On the provider side, before sending an SVC codestream, the current V ib is initially
sent to receivers over the SSL channel as shown in Figure 4, where V ibi is the features
of the ith block (m× m). During transmission of the SVC codestream, besides sending
the SVC frame data, if an AU contains UIBs or ABlocks, authentication tags (Vuib and
Puib) of the updated background and authentication tags (Vf ) of the foreground are
also encapsulated into the SEI NALU, and then synchronously delivered along the AU.
On the receiver side, once the base layer is verified, the position information (P)
of foreground ABlocks are collected from embedded watermarking. Receivers next
decode the received base and enhancement layers in order to reconstruct a higher-
quality/resolution image I j , as shown in Figure 5. Similar to the provider, the image
is first scaled to the same resolution as the base layer before verifying the content
integrity of the enhancement layers. The present scheme consists of foreground verifi-
cation, background verification, and update background verification.
Foreground verification. Given a reconstructed image I j , based on position infor-
mation P of the ABlocks, the receiver extracts content-based features V ′f of ABlocks
as the provider does, and calculates the foreground error e f =‖ Vf − V ′f ‖. If e f falls
within the robustness range of the content-based feature, the foreground is genuine;
otherwise, it is bogus. For detailed analysis on the detection performance, including
the probabilities of miss and false alarms, the reader is referred to Monga and Mihcak
[2007].
Background verification. Besides ensuring the integrity of foreground ABlocks, IBs
of the background also should be verified. Similar to provider sides, the present scheme
also constructs a background image I′b at receiver sides as shown in Figure 5. I
′
b is
originally empty.
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Assume I0 is the first received image. Given a background block IBi, the present
scheme verifies it by extracted features V ib
′
i and received V
ib
i . Similar to foreground
ABlocks verification, background error eib =‖ V ibi − V ib
′
i ‖ can decide if IBi is modified.
If IBi is verified, it will be copied to construct the background image I′b. Once IBi of I
′
b is
filled, IBi of following images I j ( j is the frame order and j > 0) can simply be verified
based on background model parameters without performing feature extraction and
content-based authentication; that is, the present scheme verifies if the received IBi is
still the background without attacks. If the pixel-based substraction distance D satisfies
Equation (4), the background pixel is verified. Otherwise, a 4 × 4 block containing the
pixel should be further verified by content-based features V ib in order to decide if the
block is indeed modified or there is a layer switch. SVC codestreams normally contain
multiple layers; receivers may dynamically switch quality/spatial scalability during
transmission. For instance, a receiver initially requires a higher-quality video of SVC
codestreams and the proposed system gradually generates I′b based on received images.
Based on I′b and Equation (4), the present scheme can quickly verify the background
of the subsequent images. However, as the receiver switches the current layer to other
layers, subtraction distance D may not satisfy Equation (4), which is caused by video
compression. Hence, under this situation, the present scheme needs to perform content-
based verification on the block in order to distinguish malicious manipulations from
the layer switch operations. If the block is accepted by content-based authentication, it
indicates that there is a layer switch, and I′b will be updated by the block. Otherwise,
it indicates that the block is modified, and the frame is rejected.
Update background verification. In addition, as SVC surveillance codestreams
have background changing (i.e., Update Inactive Blocks), the present scheme verifies
UIBs based on Vuib and Puib. Simultaneously, outdated IBs of I′b will be alternated by
the latest verified UIBs.
Note that if and only if both the foreground and background are verified, enhance-
ment layers are accepted; otherwise, the received enhancement layers of the frame are
regarded to have been modified, and the frame is rejected.
4. EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments are carried out on a Windows 7 PC with a 2.67GHz Intel dual-core
i7 processor and 4.00GB memory. We exploit Opencv2 and FFmpeg3 open sources to
efficiently process surveillance video (e.g., capturing, scaling, or displaying); utilize
JSVM 9.19 [JSVM 2011] as the encoder of SVC codestreams; take the hall sequence,
SPEVI [SPEVI 2005], and CAVIAR Test Case Scenarios [CAVIAR 2004] as experimen-
tal datasets; link NMFlib4 to extract features; and choose nmf_alspg (alternating
least squares using a projected gradient method) to compute the factorization.
In our experiments, we set the GOP size and Intra period as 16, and parameters
m= 4, r1 = 1, δ = 5, and σ = 4. For quality scalability experiments, the encoded SVC
codestreams contain three layers (i.e., QP40, QP35, and QP20). For spatial scalability
experiments, the encoded SVC codestreams consist of one base layer (QP40) and two
enhancement layers (QP35 and QP20). The QPs of enhancement layers are no more
than 38 [Wei et al. 2013]. Experimental results show that the proposed TrustSSV is
trustworthy because it causes low computation cost and less communication overhead
and can detect tampering fields.
2http://opencv.org/.
3http://ffmpeg.zeranoe.com/.
4http://www.ee.columbia.edu/grindlay/code.html.
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4.1. Computation Cost
As described in Section 3, the background image Ib is constructed for indoor surveillance
scenes before sending SVC video data. In fact, it can be completed during setup of
the surveillance system; hence, we don’t count the cost (offline) in our computation
complexity. We assume that Ib is generated.
Provider and receiver sides have different computation complexities. The present
scheme tries to put most of the computation operations at the provider side so as to
reduce receiving devices’ CPU (Computer Processor Unit) and memory cost. At the
provider side, authentication cost consists of base layer authentication cost Ab (i.e., an
MAC operation cost) and enhancement layer authentication cost Ae. We omit Ab as
compared with Ab  Ae. Ae can be represented as
Ae = Ame + Auibe + Afe , (12)
where Ame is the background mode cost (online), A
uib
e is the processing cost of UIBs (e.g.,
feature extraction), and Afe is the processing cost of ABlocks (e.g., location and fea-
ture extraction of ABlock). Our experiments on sequence motinas room160 audiovisua
(360 × 288) indicate that Ame is about 0.017μs for one frame. Auibe is given by
Auibe = nuib · o(m2r1), (13)
where nuib is the number of UIBs. It is the NMF transform cost that does a rank r1 NMF
on nuib · m× mmatrices. Generally, Auibe is very small compared with the computation
cost of the foreground because surveillance videos have a limited update background.
Afe is given by
Afe = nf · o(m2r1) + o(nfm2r1), (14)
where nf is the number of ABlocks. The first term is due to the NMF hash algorithm,
which does a rank r1 NMF on nf · m× m matrices; the second term is due to pseudo-
random statistics obtained from the resulting NMF vector of length nf · (m× 2r1).
On the other hand, the receiver’s cost correspondingly contains base layer verification
cost Vb and enhancement layer verification cost Ve. Vb is the same with Ab (i.e., MAC
operation). Ve, however, is different from Ae: it does not have the background model
cost Ame :
Ve = Vbe + V fe , (15)
where Vbe is the verification cost of the background, and V
f
e is the verification cost of
the foreground, which is the same as Equation (14). Vbe is described as
Vbe = nb1 · o(m2r1) + nb2 · o
(
2∑
i=0
(m× m)
)
, (16)
where nb = nb1 + nb2 (nb is the number of the background blocks). The first item is the
content-based verification cost, and the second item is the RGB substraction verifica-
tion cost. For example, our experiments on the sequence motinas room160 audiovisual
(1,068 frames) show that there are 14,471 ABlocks and no UIBs. Experimental results
indicate that Ae and Ve are about 2,167.94μs and 3,910.94μs for each AU, respectively.
4.2. Communication Cost
For an SVC surveillance codestream, the present scheme should initially send the
content-based features V ib of the background image Ib to every receiver; hence, it
causes Lib = n× (m× 2r1) communication cost based on Equation (3). Lib depends on n
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Table I. Communication Overhead of Quality Scalability
Frame Frame ABlock Original Overhead Overhead
Name Number (Number) (Bytes) (Bytes) (%)
walk 1,072 11,820 2,419,725 66,492 2.75
enter 384 3,948 1,029,618 20,570 2.29
room160 1,072 18,403 6,762,669 73,076 1.08
room150 1,072 24,318 3,654,744 78,990 2.16
chamber 1,089 38,129 9,752,635 93,668 0.96
intelligent 300 2,974 851,069 18,275 2.15
hall 300 5,775 1,661,133 21,075 1.27
Table II. Communication Overhead of Spatial Scalability
Frame Frame ABlock Original Overhead Overhead
Name Number (Number) (Bytes) (Bytes) (%)
walk 1,172 5,943 2,688,493 65,715 2.44
enter 384 2,524 1,056,077 23,370 2.09
room160 1,072 8,685 6,806,130 63,357 0.93
room150 1,075 10,512 3,708,985 65,337 1.76
chamber 1,120 18,096 10,134,994 75,216 0.72
intelligent 300 2,443 858,499 17,743.5 2.07
hall 300 2,934 1,583,646 18,234 1.15
and r1. For instance, assume the resolution of Ib is QCIF, n is equal to ( 176m × 144m = 1,584),
and Lib has 12,672 hash elements. Since V ib is delivered to receivers before sending
SVC data under the SSL channel, we do not count them into our communication cost
in this article.
Besides V ib, the present scheme needs to utilize extra SEI NALUs to carry the MAC
value of the base layer, the position and features of UIBs (Puib and Vuib), and content-
based features of ABlocks (Vf ) for each AU. In all, the communication cost is given by
L = Lsei + Lb + Lf + Luib, (17)
where Lsei is the length of the SEI header, Lb is the MAC value length of the base layer,
Lf is the overhead caused by the foreground, and Luib is the overhead produced from
the update of the background. Luib is variable; while Lsei and Lb are constant, they are
equal to 19 and 32, respectively. Lf depends on u; for example, u is equal to 16, and the
features length of the foreground is equal 24 bytes.
The experimental results on the test sequences are shown in Table I and Ta-
ble II. walk and enter refer to walkbyshop1 f ront and enterexitcrossingpaths1 f ront,
respectively. room160 and room150 refer to motinas room160 audiovisual and
motinas room150 audiovisual, respectively. chamber, intelligent, and hall refer to
motinas chamber audiovisual, intelligentroom raw, and hall, respectively. walk de-
scribes a couple walking along corridor browsing and people going inside and coming
out of stores. enter describes two people crossing paths at the entrance of a store and a
couple walking on the corridor. room160 and room105 are recorded in rooms with rever-
berations, while chamber is recorded in a room with reduced reverberations. intelligent
records a student who does some activities with a static camera, while hall records two
people walking along a corridor. The average communication overheads are 1.81% and
1.60% for quality and spatial scalability, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Removing attack of foreground.
Fig. 7. Replacing attack of foreground.
4.3. Tampering Detection
In this subsection, tampering detection experiments are performed on protected SVC
surveillance codestreams, and detected results are illustrated and analyzed. Since cryp-
tographic authentication (e.g., MAC) is performed on the base layer, adversaries cannot
attack any bits of the base layer. Hence, we only describe the tampering experiments of
enhancement layers, for example, basic attacks (color and illuminate manipulations)
or object attacks (inserting, removing, and replacing manipulations). We will discuss
foreground and background attacks, respectively.
Foreground tampering detection. Foreground ABlocks are located by the water-
marking of the base layer. It is impossible for adversaries to modify foreground content
without the secret key ke because once the content of the foreground is modified (e.g.,
replacing, removing, or inserting), the extracted features V ′f will not be verified by Vf .
Figure 6 illustrates that original time (141) is removed. Figure 7 illustrates that the
man’s face is replaced by a woman’s face.
Background tampering detection. Based on Section 3.4, there are two verification
processing techniques. First, if the IBs of I′b are not filled, we make use of content-
based features to verify IBs. If a background IB is attacked, its content-based features
mismatch from the original one, and then the tampering block is detected. Second,
after the generation of background image I′b, the present scheme verifies enhancement
layers by the subtraction operations. For each background block, the present scheme
calculates the pixel-based (RGB) distance based on Equation (4). If the distance is
smaller than the threshold, the pixel is accepted. Otherwise, the block containing
the pixel should be verified by content-based authentication in order to decide if the
unsatisfied distance is caused by malicious manipulations or layer switch operations.
Generally, meaningful content attacks must cause large distance because they change
the texture, luminance, or color of attacked blocks. For example, Figure 8 illustrates an
inserting attack of the background; a new rubbish bin is inserted into the background.
Figure 9 illustrates a removing attack of the background; a small object at the bottom
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Fig. 8. Inserting attack of background.
Fig. 9. Removing attack of background.
of the door is removed. Both content-based and substraction verifications can detect
the attacks and locate the tampering places.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
5.1. Security
Given the input kb and 	b, the present scheme outputs an MAC that ensures that a
receiver who knows the secret key kb can detect any changes to the base layer. Hence,
it is impossible that adversaries modify the content of the base layer without being
detected.
Besides the base layer, SVC codestreams also supply various enhancement layers in
order to produce higher-quality/resolution images. For the background, we assume that
the content-based features of the initial background image are transmitted to receivers
over an SSL channel, which ensures the security of V ib. For an updated background,
the position information P and content-based features Vuib of UIBs are encrypted by a
block cipher such as AES. It’s well known that block ciphers can be regarded as secure
pseudo-random permutations, and it is computationally infeasible to distinguish the
output of a block cipher from that of a truly random permutation [Katz and Lindell
2008]. For the foreground, since the content-based features Vf of ABlocks are the inner
product of NMF hash h and pseudo-random weight vector {ti}ui=1, this implies that
an attacker cannot forge Vf without the knowledge of the secret key ke, although the
attacker knows the content of SVC codestreams.
5.2. Scalability
The present scheme preserves the scalability of the original SVC codestreams because
the proposed authentication scheme does not affect the standard structure of SVC code-
streams. That is, MANEs (Media Aware Network Elements) can still transparently
adapt SVC codestreams based on receivers’ scalable requirements. As receivers only
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Table III. Comparison with Other H.264/SVC Authentication Schemes, QS
(Quality Scalability) and SS (Spatial Scalability)
Tampered Authentication Dependence on Communication
Scheme Location Operation SVC Structure Overhead
Cryptographic authentication No All layer Yes QS 2.19%
[Mokhtarian and Hefeeda 2010] hash SS 2.62%
Watermarking authentication Yes All layer Yes QS 8.66%
[Meerwald and Uhl 2010] watermarking SS 2.93%
Proposed Yes Base layer hash No QS 1.81%
authentication content-based features SS 1.60%
obtain the base layer codestream, the proposed scheme verifies it by cryptographic-
based authentication (i.e., MAC). As receivers obtain higher-quality and/or spatial
enhancement layers, the proposed scheme further verifies them by content-based au-
thentication, that is, authenticating once, verifying many ways [Wu and Deng 2006].
5.3. Robustness and Sensitivity
The base layer is protected by cryptographic-based authentication; thus, the present
scheme is sensitive to any bits changing for the base layer. This is suitable for SVC
applications as discussed in Section 1. That is, the base layer is the basic and the most
important component of SVC codestreams such that it must be transmitted to clients
at any session. In addition, since the base layer as the previewing version contains the
lowest-quality and -resolution images, there is no need to perform transcoding on the
base layer. Hence, it is reasonable that the base layer is sensitive to any bit changing.
For enhancement layers, the present scheme employs the content-based authenti-
cation to ensure their integrity. The robustness of content-based features is suitable
for scalable properties of SVC codestreams, that is, authenticating once, verifying
many ways. For example, a receiver may obtain different quality/resolution images
under various network or device requirements, but all of them can be verified by
their content-based features. On the other hand, the sensitivity of content-based
features can distinguish incidental manipulations from malicious manipulations.
Hence, attacked enhancement layers will be detected and rejected as described in
Section 4.3.
5.4. Comparison with Other Schemes
Compared with the hybrid scheme [Wei et al. 2014a], the communication overhead of
the proposed scheme is 1.81% and 1.60% for quality scalability and spatial scalability,
respectively, which is less than 2.42% and 2.16% of the hybrid scheme. Compared
with the AUSSS scheme [Wei et al. 2013], the scheme proposed here causes similar
communications overhead with Wei et al. [2013] and overcomes the shortcoming of
Wei et al. [2013], which may bypass ABlocks when an SVC codestream contains a
lower-quality base layer.
Table III describes the performance of the proposed TrustSSV as compared with
existing cryptographic and watermarking authentication schemes.
—Tampered location: cryptographic authentication cannot locate tampered loca-
tions, while the present scheme and watermarking scheme can.
—Authentication operation: TrustSSV only depends on base layer codestreams and
content-based features of SVC surveillance data, while cryptographic authentication
and watermarking-based authentication must involve hash or watermarking of every
SVC layer to prevent the attacks on unprotected layers. Hence, TrustSSV produces
constant communication overhead, but cryptographic authentication [Mokhtarian
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and Hefeeda 2010] and watermarking-based authentication [Meerwald and Uhl
2010] are variable. Their overhead increases with the number of enhancement lay-
ers. For example, with a GOP size of 8, each frame will carry 40 bytes more overhead
[Mokhtarian and Hefeeda 2010] when an SVC sequence contains one more enhance-
ment layer.
—Dependence: cryptographic authentication and watermarking-based authentica-
tion depend on a layer prediction relationship of SVC in order to construct hashing
chain or embed watermarking, while TrustSSV is independent of the SVC structure;
that is, it is transparent to users.
—Communication overhead: suppose an SVC codestream with three spatial/quality
layers and a GOP size of 16. Compared to the state-of-the-art methods (i.e., crypto-
graphic and watermarking authentication), the cryptographic authentication scheme
in Mokhtarian and Hefeeda [2010] incurs a communication overhead of around 2.19%
and 2.62% of the GOP size for quality and spatial scalability, respectively, whereas
the watermarking authentication scheme in Meerwald and Uhl [2010] incurs around
8.66% and 2.93% communication overhead for quality and spatial scalability, respec-
tively.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article, a secure and robust authentication scheme was proposed for SVC
surveillance codestreams. According to the quality/spatial layer characteristics of SVC
codestreams, the proposed scheme exploited cryptographic-based authentication to
protect the base layer and content-based authentication to ensure the content integrity
of quality/resolution enhancement layers. Based on the fact that most surveillance
videos contain stable scenes, in order to increase the efficiency of authentication/
verification, the proposed scheme utilized a background model to differentiate back-
ground from foreground and initially send background features once and dynamically
update foreground features in real time. Evaluation indicates that TrustSSV preserves
the SVC scalability property, detects tampered regions, and can be applied to most
video streams with layer structures (e.g., HEVC/SVC, JPEG-XR). Experimental
results showed that TrustSSV introduces much lower communication overhead than
cryptographic-based and watermarking-based authentication, and has low computa-
tion complexity. Therefore, TrustSSV is trustworthy and suitable to big video data
applications.
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